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Changing Voting Patterns in the
Burger Court: The Impact of
Personnel Change*
EDWARD V. HECK**
This article investigates the impact of personnel change in the
Supreme Court by examining the transition from the Warren
Court to the Burger Court (1969-1972). Each change in the mem-
bership of the Court during this period changed the Court's inter-
nal voting patterns. President Nixon, in short, was successful in
appointing Justices to slow the libertarian drive of the late War-
ren Court. This finding suggests that a president blessed with suf-
ficient vacancies has substantial-but hardly unlimited-
capacity to reshape the Court through exercise of the appoint-
ment power.
Every change in the membership of the Supreme Court creates
possibilities for reshaping the Court's voting patterns and policy
outputs. The effects of personnel change are particularly signifi-
cant when a President seeks to redirect the Court by appointing
Justices who share his views on salient policy issues. Such was
the situation when Richard M. Nixon assumed the presidency in
1969.
The period of transition from the Warren Court to the Burger
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Court (1969-72) affords an unusual opportunity for in-depth exam-
ination of the impact of personnel change. Retirements, a resig-
nation, deaths, new appointments, and rejected nominations-all
occurring in a politically charged atmosphere-were responsible
for unusually rapid fluctuation in the membership of the Court
between June 1969 and January 1972.
This paper focuses on the question of how voting patterns and
opinion content changed in response to shifts in the makeup of
the Court. This investigation of the impact of personnel change
should shed light on more general questions about the nature of
change in the Court and on the relationship between the Court
and the broader political system.
ELECTORAL Porncs AND THE COURT: 1968-72
Without a doubt, the central figure in the series of events that
in time transformed the "Warren Court" into the "Burger Court"
was President Richard Nixon. Chief Justice Earl Warren's fears
that Nixon-an old adversary from California politics-might have
the opportunity to choose his successor seems to have prompted
the Chief Justice's conditional retirement in June 1968.1 If the
policies of the Warren Court were to be preserved, it seemed es-
sential that Warren move quickly to allow President Lyndon B.
Johnson to name a new Chief Justice. Johnson had secured the
libertarian activism of the late 1960's with the appointments of
Justices Fortas and Marshall.2
Johnson's nominations of Fortas as Chief Justice and Texan
Homer Thornberry as an associate Justice were hardly astute
choices for a skilled political manipulator, particularly in light of
the historical difficulties encountered by "lame duck" Presidents
seeking to fill Supreme Court vacancies. 3 As hearings on the For-
tas nomination dragged through the summer of 1968 and into the
fall, the points of opposition multiplied-"cronyism," disregard for
separation of powers, conflict of interest, and simple senatorial
opposition to Warren Court decisions on such issues as obscenity,
capital punishment, internal security, and the rights of the ac-
cused.4 With a filibuster in the offing after defeat of a cloture mo-
1. Warren announced his intention to retire in a letter to the President. Let-
ter from Earl Warren to Lyndon B. Johnson (June 13, 1968), reprinted in 1968-69
PUB. PAPERS 746. Johnson responded that he would accept Warren's retirement
"at such time as a successor is qualified." Letter from Lyndon B. Johnson to Earl
Warren (June 26, 1978), reprinted in 1968-69 Pun. PAPERS 747.
2. See also J. POLLACK, EARL WARREN: THE JUDGE WHO CHANGED AmERICA
275-78 (1979).
3. R. SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PRESIDENCY 97-100 (1971).
4. On the Fortas nomination, see letter from Senator Ervin to the Washington
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tion, Fortas had little choice but to request that his nomination be
withdrawn.5 Thus, the Warren Court remained intact for its final
Term (1968-69). With both Fortas and Warren still on the bench,
supporters of the Warren Court labelled the campaign to block
his nomination a "pyrrhic victory."6
Within a year, however, the Warren Court's enemies regrouped
and won a real victory. During the 1968 campaign Nixon had
openly attacked the Warren Court, promising to fill vacancies
with "strict constructionists" if he were elected.7 The "strict con-
structionist" label was, of course, pure rhetoric. What Nixon
clearly wanted were Justices who would favor the needs of law
enforcement over the constitutional claims of those accused of
crime-the "peace forces" over the "criminal forces."8
Despite Nixon's presence in the White House, Warren's actual
retirement was set for the final day of the 1968-69 Term. On that
day, President Nixon-as a member of the Supreme Court bar-
appeared before the Court to celebrate his triumph and witness
the swearing in of Warren E. Burger as Chief Justice of the
United States.9
The departure of Warren and the appointment of Burger
marked the beginning of the transition to a new "era" in Supreme
Court decisionmaking. Clearly the new Chief Justice was a man
after Nixon's own heart on the policy issues central to Nixon's
campaign against the Warren Court-an outspoken foe of Mi-
randa v. Arizona'0 and a firm supporter of "law and order.""
Nor was Nixon content with a single appointment in his drive to
reconstruct the Court "in his own image." A month before the
Chief Justice's retirement took effect, Justice Fortas quietly
stepped aside amidst none-too-subtle threats of possible criminal
Post (Aug. 9, 1968). 114 CONG. REC. 28153 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Hollings); Nomi-
nations of Abe Fortas and Homer Thornberry: Hearings Before the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 359 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Thurmond); 114
CONG. REc. 28928 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Lausche); Id. at 28932 (remarks of Sen.
Dirksen). See also R. SHOGAN, A QUESTION OF JUDGMENT (1972).
5. 1968-69 PUB. PAPERS 1000.
6. Mason, Pyrrhic Victory: The Defeat of Abe Fortas, 45 VA. Q. REV. 28 (1969).
7. J. SIMON, IN HIS OWN IMAGE 5 (1973); S. WASBY, CONTINUITY AND CHANGE
12 (1976).
8. J. SION, supra note 7, at 7.
9. RETIREMENT OF MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN, 395 U.S. vii (1969); J. SIMON,
supra note 7, at 1-2.
10. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
11. J. SIMON, supra note 7, at 74-96.
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prosecution emanating from John Mitchell's Justice Depart-
ment.'2
Although Nixon's goal of placing a southerner on the Supreme
Court was denied when the Senate refused to confirm, in turn,
Judges Haynsworth and Carswell, the appointment of Judge
Harry F. Blackmun in June 1970 marked the second step toward
fulfillment of the President's campaign pledge to overhaul the
Court. With the appointment of Justices Powell and Rehnquist to
replace departed Justices Black and Harlan, the "Nixon Court"
was in place.
Between Burger's appointment in June 1969 and the swearing
in of Nixon appointees Powell and Rehnquist in January 1972
there were three distinct "Courts" of varying composition.' 3 Dur-
ing most of the 1969-70 Term, Burger presided over a Court of
eight Justices (Court 80).14 The seating of Blackmun reconsti-
tuted a nine-member Court (Court 81), which continued through
the 1970-71 Term. After the departure of Black and Harlan, a
court of seven Justices (Court 82) decided all cases argued in the
1971-72 Term prior to the seating of Powell and Rehnquist.
In this article, votes and opinions in each of these "natural
Courts" will be examined in an effort to isolate the effect of per-
sonnel change on the Court's decisions. At the same time the
question of how rapidly the libertarian Warren Court was being
transformed into a Court that would render decisions more in
keeping with President Nixon's policy preferences will be consid-
ered. Before analyzing the three Courts of the transitional pe-
riod, voting patterns in the last years of the Warren Court (Court
79: 1967-69) will be summarized. Using this period as a baseline,
it will be possible to measure in a rough way how the internal bal-
ance of power shifted in each Court. By comparing the dissent
rates and majority participation scores of Justices Brennan and
Marshall (the holdovers from the liberal mainstream of the War-
ren Court) with those of Chief Justice Burger (probably the
12. Letter from Abe Fortas to President Richard M. Nixon (May 14, 1969), re-
printed in 1969 PUB. PAPERS 375. See also L. KOHLMEIR, GOD SAVE THIS HONORA-
BLE COURT! 100-02 (1972).
13. John Sprague proposed the use of "natural Courts" to analyze Supreme
Court voting data. He defined a "natural Court" as a period during which there
was no change in personnel. His approach is widely accepted by political scien-
tists. J. SPRAGUE, VOTING PATTERNS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 6
(1968).
14. The numerical designation for each Court is based on the Courts listed in
H. CHASE & C. DUCAT, CONsTrrunONAL INTERPRETATION 1357-60 (1974). Chase and
Ducat, however, erroneously list a Court that included both Fortas and Burger in
1969. Since Fortas and Burger were never members of the Supreme Court at the
same time, that Court has been excluded from the count.
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Nixon appointee who most fully reflected the President's policy
positions), we should be able to chart the progress of Nixon's ef-
forts to reshape the Court through the appointment process.
When the Court's decisions shift in the direction of Nixon's pref-
erences, we should note a rise in Burger's majority participation
score, accompanied by a decline in the majority participation
scores of Justices Brennan and Marshall and a corresponding in-
crease in their dissent rates.
THE LAST YEARS OF THE WARREN COURT: A BASELINE
Although the Supreme Court was engulfed in political contro-
versy throughout Earl Warren's final year on the Court, Court 79
(1967-69) was characterized by a continuation of the pragmatic
libertarian policy trend of the Warren era. The "constitutional
revolution" continued unabated as the majority extended liberta-
rian principles in such traditional areas as school desegregation,
criminal justice, and reapportionment and opened the field of pov-
erty law to constitutional adjudication for the first time.'5 More-
over, the Justices did not shy away from conflict with a coordinate
branch of government, asserting power to review congressional
decisions on the seating of members of the House of Representa-
tives in Powell v. McCormack.16
Firmly in the mainstream of this Court were Justice Brennan,
long the "glue of the liberal majority,"' 7 and Justice Marshall,
whose appointment in 1967 had provided a reliable vote to assure
libertarian majorities despite increasingly frequent defections to
the conservative side by Justice Black. With only 6 dissents in
378 cases,1 8 Brennan was in the majority in 98.4% of the cases de-
cided during this two-year period (see Table 1). Close behind
was Marshall, whose 9 dissents in 248 cases gave him a majority
15. See notes 22-33 infra.
16. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
17. Totenberg, Conflict at the Court, WASHINGTONIAN, Feb. 1974, reprinted in
READINGS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 75-76, 162 (1975).
18. David Rohde and Harold Spaeth have pointed out that: "Although there is
no inherent superiority in counting cases and votes one way rather than another,
the matter of method is sufficiently important to require specification." D. ROHDE
& H. SPAT, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 134 (1976). I have included all
cases decided with full opinion (unanimous or not), plus all cases decided with per
curiam opinions that evoked dissent on the merits by one or more Justices. When
several cases are decided with a single opinion, each case has been counted sepa-
rately. These rules are essentially the same as those followed by Rohde and
Spaeth. Id. at 135-37.
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participation score of 96.4%. Not even the Chief Justice, with 22
dissents, or Fortas, with 25 dissents, could match these figures.
Frequently, voting as a bloc,19 these four Justices controlled the
Court's decisions by forming temporary alliances with such Jus-
tices as Douglas, Stewart, White, and (on first and fifth amend-
ment issues in particular) Black.
Table 1
Dissents and Majority Participation
Court 79 (1967-69)
Justice Number of Majority Participation Dissents
Cases Number Percentage Number Percentage
Brennan 378 372 98.4% 6 1.6%
Marshall 248 239 96.4% 9 3.6%
Warren 374 352 94.1% 22 5.9%
Fortas 328 303 92.4% 25 7.6%
Stewart 377 311 82.5% 66 17.5%
White 376 302 80.3% 74 19.7%
Douglas 370 279 75.4% 91 24.6%
Black 377 258 68.4% 119 31.6%
Harlan 376 255 67.8% 121 32.2%
Even more complete was the dominance of the Brennan-Mar-
shall view in cases involving civil liberties claims. 20 Dissenting
only three times in two years, Brennan voted with the majority in
98.5% of civil liberties cases, while Marshall ified only six dis-
sents. Moreover, Justice Douglas frequently voted with the For-
tas-Marshall-Warren-Brennan bloc in civil liberties cases. Not
only could these five Justices control the outcome whenever they
voted together, but they also were able to gain the support of one
or more of the relatively conservative Justices in many cases.
Overall, civil liberties claimants prevailed in 141 (83.9%) of 168
nonunanimous cases, usually with votes to spare. Never had the
Supreme Court been as hospitable to libertarian claims as in
these two years.
Analyzing doctrinal developments in this period, Louis Henkin
suggests that the civil liberties decisions of this Court repre-
19. The average interagreement score for these four Justices was 92.2%-far
above normal criteria for identification as a bloc. See J. SPRAGUE, supra note 13, at
56.
20. A "civil liberties case" is defined as one in which the Court's decision
turns on a claim of personal right involving the Bill of Rights or the fourteenth
amendment, or one turning on analogous claims under federal statutes. Included
are claims arising under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the various
civil rights statutes. See G. SCHUBERT, THE JtmicLAL Mwu 102 (1965).
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sented two major operations in the Warren Court's final campaign
for civil liberties.21 On the one hand, there was a great deal of
"mopping up" as the Justices attempted to deal with new twists
on the civil liberties issues that had occupied the Justices
throughout the Warren era. On the other hand, the dominant ma-
jority (excepting Douglas) also on occasion engaged in "With-
drawing from too-advanced positions."22 Henkin's categorization
summarizes much of this Court's civil liberties policy making.
Yet, it tends to overlook the cases in which the Justices struck out
in new directions, particularly in the field of poverty law. More-
over, Henkin does not recognize the extent to which the "mop-
ping up" operation in such areas as reapportionment and school
desegregation involved the formulation of new approaches to
constitutional interpretation. Thus, a full acount of decision-mak-
ing trends in the final years of the Warren Court would include:
(1) "mopping up" or consolidation, including the formulation of
new hard-line libertarian doctrines; (2) movement into new policy
arenas; and (3) "withdrawing from too-advanced positions."
Given the number and significance of innovative decisions
handed down between 1962 and 1967, it is hardly surprising that
the final two years of the Warren Court involved a great deal of
"mopping up." No case better illustrates the nature of this pro-
cess than United States v. Robel,23 in which the majority, after
years of undermining antisubversive legislation by construction,
finally invalidated the heart of the statutory scheme on first
amendment grounds. In criminal justice cases, the majority
largely completed the process of "selective incorporation," hold-
ing that the right to a jury trial2 4 and freedom from double jeop-
ardy25 were fully binding on the states. In Katz v. United States2 6
a seven to one majority extended the warrant and probable cause
requirements of the fourth amendment to all cases involving elec-
tronic eavesdropping, and in Kaufman v. United States27 the Jus-
tices ruled that illegal search and seizure claims could be raised
in a federal habeas corpus petition. Leading race relations cases
21. Henkin, Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HAxv. L REV. 65 (1968).
22. Id.
23. 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
24. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
25. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
26. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
27. 394 U.S. 217 (1969). Kaufman was explicitly overruled by the Burger Court
in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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were Jones v. Mayer,28 in which the Justices construed the 1868
Civil Rights Act as an open housing law, and Green v. New Kent
County,29 in which the Justices at last announced that token de-
segregation no longer satisfied the mandate of Brown v. Board of
Education.30 The tendency to adopt a hard-line approach while
"mopping up" old problems was nowhere more apparent than in
reapportionment cases, in which a five-member majority adopted
"precise mathematical equality" as the standard for congressional
districting.3 ' Even in the well-ploughed fields of racial discrimina-
tion and reapportionment, then, this Court continued to break
new ground.
At the same time, the Justices were moving, none too hesi-
tantly, into new constitutional fields. In Flast v. Cohen32 the Jus-
tices relaxed rules of standing for those seeking to invoke the
judicial process to enforce the first amendment's establishment of
religion clause, and in Powell v. McCormack33 the Justices ex-
panded the scope of judicial supervisory power over Congress.
Perhaps the most significant of these new departures came in
Shapiro v. Thompson.34  Justice Brennan's opinion in this
landmark case not only signalled that the Court was receptive to
cases asserting the rights of the poor, but also established a
framework for future analysis of such equal protection issues as
sex discrimination and state school financing.
Less common were cases illustrating retreat from libertarian
positions. Yet, the twenty-seven cases in which the Court re-
jected civil liberties claims demonstrate that even this most liber-
tarian of Supreme Courts remained responsive to pragmatic
considerations which might temper libertarian ardor. Most nota-
ble of these cases is Terry v. Ohio,35 in which eight Justices joined
Chief Justice Warren's opinion explicitly recognizing society's in-
terest in effective law enforcement. Over the protests of Justices
Black and Douglas, the majority also refused to apply prior liber-
tarian rulings retroactively.3 6
28. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
29. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969); Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526
(1969).
32. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
33. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
34. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
35. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
36. Jenkins v. Delaware, 395 U.S. 213 (1969); Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S.
831 (1969); Kaiser v. New York, 394 U.S. 280 (1969); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S.
244 (1969); Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631
(1968). For an analysis of retroactivity cases, see Fablund, Retroactivity and the
1028
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The Court that President Nixon sought to reshape in his own
image, then, was a Court strongly, but not absolutely, committed
to libertarian policies. Civil liberties claimants prevailed nearly
eighty-four percent of the time, usually by votes of six to three or
better. Almost without exception this Court reflected the views of
Justices Brennan and Marshall. With Fortas and Warren as firm
allies and Douglas even more strongly committed to libertarian
claims, Court 79 offered a tough challenge to a President bent on
curtailing the libertarian activism of the previous seven years.
THE FRESHMAN YEAR OF THE BURGER COURT
A necessary condition for successful exercise of presidential ap-
pointment power to change the policy direction of the Supreme
Court is the existence of vacancies. However, not just any va-
cancy will do. If the President can only replace Justices who al-
ready agree with his positions, the appointment is not likely to
affect the Court's voting patterns. If his influence is to be felt, the
President must replace Justices who adhere to the policies the
President wishes to change. For Nixon the situation could hardly
have been more promising. Not only was he presented with two
vacancies within his first year in office, but he also had the oppor-
tunity to replace two crucial members of the voting coalition











Dissents and Majority Participation
Court 81 (1969-70)
Number of Majority Participation Dissents
Cases Number Percentage Number Percentage
107 99 92.5% 8 7.5%
131 116 88.5% 15 11.5%
132 115 87.1% 17 12.9%
131 106 80.9% 25 19.1%
130 104 80.0% 26 20.0%
120 86 71.7% 34 28.3%
129 90 69.8% 39 30.2%
130 84 64.6% 46 35.4%
With the departure of Fortas and Warren, the dominant coali-
Warren Court, 35 J. POL. 570 (1973) and R. FUNSTON, CONSTIUONAL COUNTERREV-
OLUTION? 211-34 (1977).
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tion of Court 79 (1967-69) was shattered almost overnight. Nixon
in effect registered a net gain of three votes likely to favor presi-
dential policy goals with the appointment of Burger. Yet, the re-
fusal of the Senate to confirm Carswell and Haynsworth meant
that Burger would spend his first year as Chief Justice as the sole
Nixon appointee on a, Court still dominated by Warren Court
holdovers. Marshall, White, and Brennan proved to be the Jus-
tices closest to the new Court's center of gravity.3 7 Marshall, with
only eight dissents, participated in 92.5% of the Court's majority
voting coalitions, while White was with the majority 88.5% of the
time and Brennan 87.1% (see Table 2).
Chief Justice Burger's thirty-nine dissents-second only to Jus-
tice Black-and his majority participation score of less than sev-
enty percent clearly demonstrate that Court 80 (1969-70) was not
a Burger Court in terms of voting strength. At thie same time,
these figures show that the personnel changes of the preceding
year had already eroded the predominant position of Brennan
and Marshall within the Court. Despite his location at the Court's
center of gravity, Marshall's dissent rate had clearly increased.
More noticeable was the decline of Justice Brennan's majority
participation score from the high nineties range in the late War-
ren Court to eighty-seven percent in the first year of the transi-
tion. The heyday of the Warren Court, in short, was past.
A focus on civil liberties cases clearly highlights the transi-
tional nature of this Court.38 Most out-of-step with the majority
was the new Chief Justice who supported only two civil liberties
claimants in nonunanimous cases, and cast twenty-four dissent-
ing votes in cases in which the majority supported libertarian
claims. On the other hand, only three of the eight Justices-
Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan-supported a majority of the
claimants in nonunanimous cases. Only by attracting the support
of two or more "swing" votes-White, Harlan, Black, and Stew-
art-could the libertarian stalwarts of the Warren era prevail on
the merits. In ten cases, many involving procedural due process
claims of the poor,3 9 White and Harlan joined the Douglas-Bren-
nan-Marshall trio to record a five to three victory for the civil lib-
erties claimant, while other combinations provided the victory
margin in five additional cases. The success of the libertarians
can be measured by the Court's overall record of support for civil
liberties claims-twenty-six accepted, twenty-one rejected in the
37. "Center of gravity" refers simply to the Justice who is most frequently on
the winning side. See G. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JuDIcIAL BEHAV-
IOR 120-21 (1959).
38. See S. WASBY, supra note 7, at 1-6, 206-08.
39. The leading case is Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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forty-seven nonunamimous civil liberties cases (55.3%). Even
though the Court accepted a majority of civil liberties claims, the
days of overwhelming support for civil liberties claimants were
gone.
Although civil liberties claimants frequently prevailed over the
dissent of the new Chief Justice, Burger was able in his first term
to block other innovative libertarian decisions by joining with the
four swing Justices in opposition to Douglas, Brennan, and Mar-
shall. In Dandridge v. Williams4 O a five to three majority struck a
major blow against further expansion of the constitutional rights
of the poor by applying the traditional "rational basis" test to re-
ject a claim that limitation of the amount of welfare payments to
large families violated the equal protection clause. By the same
five to three vote, the Court rejected claims that seemed to chal-
lenge the entire system of plea bargaining in criminal cases, hold-
ing that the Court would not permit challenges to any plea that
could be construed as voluntary, even if motivated by a desire to
avoid the death penalty4l or by an earlier coerced confession.42
Permeating Justice White's opinion for the Court in a companion
case is the attitude that plea bargaining is necessary to assure
continued functioning of the criminal justice system.43 Although
Brennan and Marshall were also unwilling to question the plea
bargaining system itself, they joined Douglas in insisting that the
Court must take action to prevent improper prosecutorial behav-
ior in the plea bargaining process.
It is these cases, in which civil liberties claims were rejected on
five to three votes, that best indicate the degree of change in the
Court brought about by the replacement of Fortas and Warren by
Burger. Other cases decided against civil liberties claims in the
first year of the Burger Court-notably fifth amendment claims in
federal regulatory statutes4 4 and the six-member-jury issue4 5--
would most likely have received the same treatment from the late
Warren Court, though probably by margins somewhat closer than
the two to six and one to seven votes by which these claims were
40. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
41. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970).
42. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
43. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-53 (1970).
44. United States v. Knox, 396 U.S. 77 (1969) (wagering tax); Minor v. United
States, 396 U.S. 87 (1969) (Marijuana Tax Act).
45. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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rejected. Although we cannot be certain how Dandridge v. Wil-
liams might have been decided by the late Warren Court, the vot-
ing patterns of Justices Fortas and Warren strongly suggest that
the outcome of the plea bargaining cases would have been differ-
ent.4
In his first year, then, the new Chief Justice was able to effect at
most an incremental shift away from expansive interpretation of
constitutional guarantees. While no libertarian decisions of the
Warren Court were reversed, reluctance to build further on War-
ren Court precedents was evident.4 7 Even when the liberal War-
ren Court holdovers prevailed on the merits, they often suggested
in concurring opinions that the majority had not gone far enough
in protecting constitutional rights.48 More than once they urged
the majority not to "slam the courthouse door" in the face of
those seeking to vindicate constitutional rights.49 Sensing omi-
nous signs in the prevalence of five to three votes and the vocifer-
ous dissents of the new Chief Justice in cases upholding civil
liberties claims, the libertarian trio reaffirmed their commitment
to the use of the courts to right perceived social wrongs.
AN EMERGING BURGER COURT?
President Nixon, of course, had other ideas. Frustrated by the
Senate's rejection of the Haynsworth and Carswell nominations,
the President turned to a northern circuit judge likely to be ac-
cepted by the Senate with little opposition. If Nixon's goal was to
change the Court along the lines favored by Chief Justice Burger,
he could hardly have done better than Blackmun. The two Min-
nesota natives had long been friends, and there is little doubt that
Burger himself lobbied for Blackmun's appointment. 0 In Black-
mun's initial years on the Court, his voting patterns closely re-
sembled those of the Chief Justice. The Burger-Blackmun
interagreement rate of 95.9% seems more than adequate to justify
46. This analysis turns on the probable votes of Fortas and Warren if they had
been members of the Court in 1970. Since they were somewhat more likely than
Justice Brennan to support claims of criminal defendants, it may be assumed that
they would have joined Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall in voting to set aside the
convictions upheld by the Burger Court in McMann and Parker. However, given
Warren's dissent in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), it would not be plau-
sible to assert that he would have voted to strike down the state welfare regula-
tions upheld in Dandridge.
47. R. FUNSTON, supra note 36, at 328-33.
48. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 39 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); Ashe v.
Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448 (1970) (Brennan, J. concurring).
49. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 786 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Barlow
v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 178 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
50. Kurland, 1970 Term: Notes on the Emergence of the Burger Court, 1971 Sup.
CT. REv. 271; Totenberg, supra note 17, at 162.
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the inevitable label, "Minnesota Twins." Although Philip B. Kur-
land's assertion that there were other sets of twins on the CourtS'
may be a bit too strong, Marshall and Brennan's interagreement
rate also remained high (89.1%).
The Burger-Blackmun and Marshall-Brennan pairs, then, are a
logical starting point for the analysis of voting patterns of Court
81 (1970-71). The pair that was more successful in persuading
other Justices to join them would dominate the Court's decision
making. Despite the propensity of Douglas to join the Marshall-
Brennan pair in civil liberties cases, the data show that Burger
and Blackmun were more successful in securing majority voting
coalitions. Although there were a number of cases where the two
wings of the Court joined forces for unanimous or eight to one de-
cisions favorable to civil liberties, Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan
formed relatively few alliances with the four center Justices
(Black, Stewart, White, and Harlan) in closely divided cases.
Blackmun and Burger, on the other hand, frequently persuaded
three and often four of the "swing" voters to join them in four to
five or three to six decisions against a civil liberties claimant. In
the thirty-five civil liberties cases dividing a unified left bloc of
three against a united front of Burger and Blackmun, the Nixon
appointees won twenty-one and the liberals only fourteen, even
though the Douglas-Marshall-Brennan bloc needed only two addi-
tional votes to prevail.
Table 3
Dissents and Majority Participation
Court 81 (1970-71)
nber of Majority Participation
ases Number Percentage Num
152 134 88.2% 18
150 129 86.0% 21
151 129 85.4% 22
150 127 84.7% 23
152 124 81.6% 28
152 117 77.0% 35
152 117 77.0% 35
148 113 76.4% 35
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Warren Court"52 (Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall) is also appar-
ent in the data on majority participation and dissents in Court 81
(see Table 3). The most frequent dissenters were Black, Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Douglas. On the other hand Chief Justice Bur-
ger's dissent rate dropped from more than thirty percent of the
cases in his first year to fourteen percent in the year after Black-
mun's appointment. Although the "Minnesota Twins" shared the
"center of gravity" with Stewart and White, they achieved consid-
erable success in displacing the Warren Court liberals from the
mainstream. In 1970-71 the Burger Court was still a Court in tran-
sition, but one beginning to tilt toward the side of the Nixon ap-
pointees.
These voting patterns are reflected in the policy decisions ren-
dered during the first year "with a fully manned Court under a
new Chief Justice. '53 As the "core of the old Warren Court,"
Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan bore the responsibility for per-
suading their colleagues to build on the framework established
between 1962 and 1969. When they were successful, the results
were what Harry Kalven has classified as decisions affirming old
values and principles.54
Despite alarms sounded by liberal critics of the emerging Bur-
ger Court, many of the most significant decisions of 1970-71 not
only reaffirmed Warren Court precedents, but also expanded
them. Most notable was Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg School
Board,55 a unanimous decision approving busing as a permissible
tool for removing the vestiges of de jure segregation. In Bivens v.
Six Unknown Agents5 6 Justice Brennan created, almost out of
thin air, an action for damages against federal officers violating
fourth amendment rights, building on Katz v. United States57 and
other Warren Court decisions emphasizing the fundamental na-
ture of the protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Also reaffirmed were earlier decisions upholding a
broad reading of the coverage of the Voting Rights Act of 196558
and assuring procedural due process for the poor.59
More often, though, the new Court pointedly refused to expand
52. Kalven, Foreword: Even When a Nation is at War, 85 HARV. L. REV. 7
(1971).
53. Id. at 4.
54. Id. at 10.
55. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
56. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
57. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
58. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971), extending Allen v. Bd. of Elec-
tions, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
59. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), extending Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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Warren Court holdings or take what Douglas, Marshall, and Bren-
nan regarded as the logical next step. The "actual malice" test of
New York Times v. Sullivan6O-the Warren Court's landmark ef-
fort to protect the press against libel suits-survived, but a major-
ity of the Justices balked at Brennan's effort to extend the test to
suits by private persons involved in newsworthy events.61 In
cases such as Palmer v. Thompson62 in the area of race relations,
Abate v. Mundt63 in the reapportionment field, and Harris v. New
York 64 and McGautha v. California65 in criminal justice, the
liberals filed extensive and strongly worded dissents against what
they perceived as attacks on the accomplishments of the Warren
Court.
Overall, Court 81 was distinctly hostile to libertarian claims,
ruling against the claimant in fifty of seventy-nine nonunanimous
civil liberties cases. This 36.7% rate of support contrasts sharply
with the 83.9% libertarian voting of Court 79 and the 53.3%
favorable record even in Court 80. Perhaps some of this falloff in
libertarian voting can be attributed to a change in the makeup of
the Court's docket as litigants pressed for extensions of rights
recognized in the Warren Court years. Yet, it is clear that person-
nel change accounts for the outcome in many of the civil liberties
cases decided by close votes. In fifteen cases decided against a
civil liberties claimant by a five to four margin, newcomer Black-
mun provided the fifth vote. In each of these decisions-and in
ten cases in which civil liberties claims were rejected by six to
three votes-the Warren Court liberals protested in vain about
the emasculation of libertarian policies.
Three cases in particular illustrate how a majority at odds with
the Warren Court majority could be formed simply by combining
the votes of the two Nixon appointees with the votes of three
holdovers who had earlier dissented (see Figure 1). In Labine v.
Vincent 66 the new majority "distinguished" an estate case from
the tort case of Levy v. Louisiana,67 in which the Warren Court
had announced a constitutional principle of equal treatment for
60. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
61. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
62. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
63. 403 U.S. 182 (1971).
64. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
65. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
66. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
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illegitimates. In the much-discussed decision of Harris v. New
York,68 Chief Justice Burger wrote that statements obtained in vi-
olation of Miranda v. Arizona 69 could be used to impeach the
credibility of a defendant who took the stand in his own defense,
in spite of language implying the contrary in Miranda. Finally, in
Rogers v. Bellei7 0 Justice Blackmun upheld a section of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act which subjected a person born abroad
of one American parent to loss of citizenship for failure to meet a
congressionally-imposed residency requirement. In order to "dis-
tinguish" this case from Afroyim v. Rusk7L-in which a five to
four Warren Court majority had ruled that citizenship could not
be lost unless voluntarily relinquished-Blackmun asserted that
citizenship bestowed by act of Congress was not citizenship
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. More realistic,
however, is Black's claim in dissent that Afroyim had been over-
ruled simply because of the change in the composition of the
court.
7 2
Whether Warren Court decisions were actually overruled or
merely distinguished in these cases is somewhat beside the point.
What is significant is that the Court's policy had changed because
the Justices who had dissented in the earlier cases had become a
majority through the appointment of new Justices who shared
their opposition to the Warren Court's libertarian decisions.
By the end of the 1970-71 Term, then, a new court was beginning
to emerge. With Justice Blackmun as an ally, Chief Justice Bur-
ger prevailed far more frequently than in the first year of the Bur-
ger Court. When the second term of the Burger era ended in
June 1971, major Warren Court decisions remained intact, yet
under attack. Even though no major precedents were openly
overruled, many were in the process of being whittled away
through "techniques of subtle erosion." 73 In civil liberties cases
the bloc of Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan lost more often than it
won. More and more frequently, they found themselves advanc-
ing in dissenting opinions the same positions they had once
championed for the majority. Since their views had changed lit-
68. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
69. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
70. 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
71. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
72. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 844-45 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting).
73. Bender, The Techniques of Subtle Erosion, HARPER's, Dec. 1972, at 18.
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tle, if any, it seems clear that the Court's change in direction may
be attributed in substantial part to changing personnel.
Such changes were by no means at an end. In less than a
month, both Justices Harlan and Black suffered disabling ill-
nesses, retired, and then died, reducing the Court's membership
to seven. In the four months required for the nomination and
confirmation by the Senate of Justices Powell and Rehnquist, the
remaining seven Justices carried on the work of the Court. Since
the departure of Black and Harlan, with their unique and diver-
gent judicial philosophies,74 had an immediate impact on the
Court's voting patterns, this interim period must be treated as a
separate Court (Court 82).
AN INTERIM COURT
With only seven Justices, Court 82 (covering all cases argued or
decided before Justices Powell and Rehnquist took their seats in
January 1972) may properly be labelled an "interim" court.7 5 That
is not to say it was a time of stagnation, however, as the Justices
once again carried on, though short-handed. It was during this
brief period that sex discrimination first attracted the attention of
the Justices as a constitutional issue under the fourteenth amend-
ment. In other decisions the Justices recognized the rights of the
Amish under the free exercise clause of the first amendment,
swept away extremely strict residency barriers to voting, and
hesitantly recognized the constitutional rights of single persons. 76
In addition, this Court was characterized by distinctive voting
patterns. The Burger-Blackmun interagreement rate dropped off
slightly to 91.8%, but Justice White frequently joined the "Minne-
sota Twins" to form a three-member bloc. Justice Stewart was
frequently an ally of Justices Brennan and Marshall. Although
Philip B. Kurland labelled the 1971-72 Term the year of the Stew-
art-White Court,77 Table 4 reveals that Justice Marshall was in the
majority more frequently than White and almost as often as Stew-
art. Justice Brennan's majority participation score (80.8%) in-
creased slightly over Court 81 (1970-71), while the dissent rates of
74. See Redlich, A Black-Harlan Dialogue on Due Process and Equal Protec-
tior Overheard in Heaven and Dedicated to Robert B. McKay, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV.
20 (1975).
75. The term was first used in Winter, The Changing Parameters of Substan-
tive Equal Protection: From the Warren to the Burger Era, 23 EMORY L. REV. 657
(1974). Winter's definition of his "interim project court" differs slightly from Court
82 because I have included cases argued prior to January 1972, even if decided af-
ter March 1972-Winter's rather arbitrary cutoff date.
76. See notes 78-83 infra.
77. Kurland, 1971 Term: The Year of the Stewart-White Court, 1972 Sup. CT.
REv. 181.
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Blackmun and Burger jumped significantly. Only Justice Douglas











Dissents and Majority Participation
Court 82 (1971-72)
mber of Majority Participation
Cases Number Percentage Numl
72 68 94.4% 4
73 67 91.8% 6
73 64 87.7% 9
73 59 80.8% 14
73 58 79.5% 15
73 54 74.0% 19










Analysis of votes in civil liberties cases further reveals that this
short period between the year of the Burger-Blackmun Court and
the advent of the mature Burger Court in early 1972 was marked
by a shift toward libertarian outcomes. Overall, the Court sup-
ported libertarian claims in fifteen of twenty-eight nonunanimous
civil liberties cases (53.5%). In addition, several landmark deci-
sions supporting civil liberties claims were unanimous. Even the
Chief Justice, who wrote opinions for a unanimous Court in the
sex discrimination 7 8 and Amish school attendance cases, 79 had a
hand in this movement. More often, though, libertarian outcomes
were attained when Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan voted to-
gether and won the support of one or more additional Justices.
Six times "swing man" Stewart provided that vote and in an addi-
tional six cases both White and Stewart joined the libertarian coa-
lition. When the Court struck down state durational residency
requirements for voting in Dunn v. BlumsteinO and implicitly
recognized a right to personal privacy for single persons in Eisen-
stadt v. Baird,81 Justice Blackmun also joined the libertarian ma-
jority.
What is noteworthy about Court 81 is that the temporary reduc-
tion of the Court to seven members made it easier to form majori-
ties favorable to civil liberties claims and the claims of poor
litigants. Decisions such as Blumstein, Reed, and Eisenstadt con-
tained at least the potential for continued development of "sub-
78. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
79. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
80. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
81. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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J
stantive equal protection."82 In addition decisions such as
Fuentes v. Shevin 83 raised hopes for a reversal of the Burger
Court's trend against recognizing new rights for the poor. Yet, the
promise of these decisions was never completely fulfilled. Al-
though Blumstein stands with only minor modifications today,
Reed did not lead to a majority decision declaring sex a suspect
classification. Fuentes did not survive a change in the personnel
of the Court, and Eisenstadt has not led to a body of constitu-
tional doctrine establishing the rights of single persons.84
In retrospect Court 82 may be significant not so much for its
civil liberties decisions as for the beginnings of serious debate
within the Court about easing access to the courts for organized
plaintiffs seeking to vindicate broad social and economic claims.
In both Sierra Club v. Morton 85 and Hawaii v. Standard Oil Com-
pany 86 the Burger Court majority rejected what amounted to in-
terest group litigation.87 At the same time, Sierra Club in
particular indicated that the majority was ready to continue its
modification of traditional concepts of standing and causes of ac-
tion. Writing for a four to three majority, Justice Stewart declared
that an organized group could obtain judicial review under the
Administrative Procedure Act only if it alleged direct harm to the
interest of the organization or its members. 88 Yet, with proper al-
82. Mendelson, From Warren to Burger. The Rise and Decline of Substantive
Equal Protection, 66 Am. POL. Sci. REV. 1226 (1972).
83. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See also Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538
(1972).
84. On the current status of Dunn v. Blumstein, see Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S.
686 (1973), and Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973), in which the Court upheld
state laws allowing registration books to be closed fifty days before an election. In
Frontiero v. Richardson, Justice Brennan wrote:
At the outset, appellants contend that classifications based upon sex, like
classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin, are inher-
ently suspect and must therefore be subject to close judicial scrutiny. We
agree and, indeed, find at least implicit support for such an approach in
our unanimous decision only last Term in Reed v. Reed.
411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973). However, only four Justices agreed, and sex has never
been held to be a suspect classification. Fuentes was "distinguished" in Mitchell v.
W.T Grant Company, provoking from Justice Stewart a dissent that closed with
these words:
A basic change in the law upon a ground no firmer than a change in our
membership invites the popular misconception that this institution is lit-
tle different from the two political branches of the Government. No mis-
conception could do more lasting injury to this Court and to the system of
law which it is our abiding mission to serve.
410 U.S. 600, 636 (1974).
85. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
86. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
87. For a provocative analysis of trends toward relaxation of traditional rules
of standing for organized plaintiffs, see Orren, Standing to Sue: Interest Group
Conflict in the Federal Courts, 70 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 723 (1976).
88. 405 U.S. at 741.
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legations an organization could use an action against a public offi-
cial as a means of vindicating its interests vis-A-vis another
private party it could not challenge directly.89
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: PERSONNEL CHANGE
AND THE TRANSITION
The transition from the Warren Court to the Burger Court was
not a straightforward march from the libertarianism of the late
Warren Court to the relatively antilibertarian position of the
Court in the latter half of the 1970's. The transition was not
wholesale, but incremental. Every change in personnel between
1969 and 1972 resulted in a change in direction for the Court.
Each of the three Courts of the transition period was unique. The
changing pattern of overall Court support for civil liberties claims
in nonunanimous cases (Table 5) illustrates how small changes in
personnel could affect the direction of policy outcomes. Similarly,
comparison of the majority participation scores of Justices Bren-
nan and Marshall (the mainstays of the late Warren Court) .with
the scores of Chief Justice Burger in each natural Court high-
lights shifts in the internal balance of power (see Table 6).
Table 5




Court 79 (1967-69) 141 27 83.9%
Court 80 (1969-70) 26 21 55.3%
Court 81 (1970-71) 29 50 36.7%
Court 82 (1971-72) 15 13 53.5%
Court 83 (1972-75) 88 164 34.9%
Court 84 (1975-78) 75 133 36.0%
The final years of the Warren Court (Court 79: 1967-69) mark a
high point in support for libertarian claims in the Supreme Court.
In 83.9% of the nonunanimous civil liberties cases, a majority of
the Justices favored a libertarian claim. Almost invariably mem-
bers of the majority in this Court were Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall, whose majority participation scores of 98.4% and 96.4%,
respectively, placed them one and two in voting on the winning
side. Not only did this Court reaffirm the libertarian doctrines of
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the previous fourteen years under Earl Warren, but it also moved
out into new frontiers of civil liberties.
The resignation of Justice Fortas, the retirement of Chief Jus-
tice Warren, and the appointment of Chief Justice Burger slowed
the expansion of rights valued by the Warren Court majority, but
did not result in wholesale adoption of values and policies favored
by the new Chief Justice and the President who appointed him.
While Court 80 (1969-70) voted to uphold civil liberties claims in a
clear majority of nonunanimous cases, the decline in pro-civil lib-
erties voting from the baseline years of 1967-69 was sharp enough
to indicate a trend. Yet, this was not a Burger Court, as the new
Chief Justice ranked seventh in majority participation score, dis-
senting in more than thirty percent of the cases decided in his
first Term. Although Justice Marshall ranked first in majority par-
ticipation percentage, and Brennan third, their scores dropped no-
ticeably from the high levels of Court 79.
The libertarian Justices' fears of loss of control were realized
when a second Nixon appointee took his seat on the Court in 1970.
With Blackmun as a firm ally, Burger was increasingly able to
pick up the additional votes necessary for his position to prevail.
His majority participation score jumped from 69.8% in Court 80 to
86% (second among the Justices) in Court 81 (1970-71). The ma-
jority participation scores of Brennan and Marshall again
dropped-this time rather precipitously-to ranks of sixth (tied
with Black) and eighth within the Court. In several cases the
new conservative majority severely limited libertarian Warren
Court precedents by combining the votes of the "Minnesota
Twins" with those of holdover dissenters from the Warren Court.
Overall the Court's support for civil liberties claims fell to a new
low of 36.7% of the nonunanimous cases.
However, the emergence of the new majority was interrupted
by the departure of Harlan and Black in the fall of 1971. In a
Court of seven Justices the trio of Douglas, Brennan, and Mar-
shall needed only one additional vote to prevail when they voted
as a bloc. Overall, Court support for civil liberties claims edged
back over the fifty percent mark, while the majority participation
scores of Brennan and Marshall rose slightly, though not to the
level of 1969-70. Burger's majority participation score, on the
other hand, dropped to seventy-four percent, sixth on a Court of
seven Justices. Several landmark decisions recalled the liberta-
rian heyday of the Warren Court.
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The libertarian gains of Court 82 proved transitory. With the
appointment of Justices Rehnquist and Powell, Chief Justice Bur-
ger at last gained the allies needed to redirect the Court into less
libertarian paths90 Thus, it was the voting patterns of the year af-
ter Blackmun's appointment that reemerged in the mature Bur-
ger Court. In the three and one-half years of Court 83 (1972-75),
the Court rejected the civil liberties claim in more than sixty-five
percent of nonunanimous cases. The Chief Justice's majority
participation score stabilized at about eighty-five percent, fourth
among the Justices. Meanwhile the majority voting records of
Brennan and Marshall fell to new lows. The replacement of
Douglas by Stevens in 1975 made little difference overall, with
support for civil liberties claims remaining at the thirty-six per-
cent level in the first three years of Court 84 (October 1975-July
1978). However, with the retirement of Douglas, Marshall and
Brennan dropped into the bottom two positions in majority voting
percentage.
By tracing these measures of support for civil liberties claims
and majority participation over the several natural Courts of the
Burger era, we obtain rough measures of the progress of Presi-
dent Nixon's efforts to transform the Court. In the final analysis it
appears that Nixon was quite successful in appointing Justices
who would slow, if not halt, the libertarian drive of the late War-
ren Court. This is not to say that the Burger Court was always a
"Nixon Court" after 1972. Clearly it was not, particularly in its
highly-publicized decisions in cases in which the principle of
checks and balances was at stake.9' Nonetheless, the contrasts
between the late Warren Court and today's Court are sharp. To-
day the Burger Court consistently rejects a substantial majority
of civil liberties claims. Several of the Warren Court's most noted
libertarian precedents have been reversed, modified, undermined,
or eroded.92 Justices Brennan and Marshall-once the occupants
90. By "less libertarian," I mean only that the Court under Burger was more
likely to reject libertarian claims than under Warren. See C. PRrrCHE'"r, CIVIL LiB-
ERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT 227 (1954). As Henry J. Abraham has pointed out,
the Burger Court has rendered some significant decisions favorable to libertarian
claims. See Abraham, Of Myths, Motives, Motivations, and Morality: Some Obser-
vations on the Burger Court's Record on Civil Rights and Liberties, 52 NOTRE
DMAm LAw. 77 (1976).
91. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). For an earlier analysis, see Howard, Is the Bur-
ger Court a Nixon Court?, 23 EMORY L.J. 745 (1974).
92. E.g. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), rev'g Kaufman v. United States,
394 U.S. 217 (1969); Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1975); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,
407 U.S. 551 (1972), overruling Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc.,
391 U.S. 308 (1968); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), distinguishing Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), distinguish-
ing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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of the "center of gravity" in the Warren Court-have become the
Burger Court's most frequent and most vocal dissenters. The
trend is clear. The transformation of the Court may be attributed
in substantial part to changes in personnel-changes that flowed
directly from Nixon's campaign attacks on the Warren Court.
More generally, this analysis of changing voting patterns in the
years of transition from the Warren to the Burger Court points to
several situational factors that affect the ability of a President to
alter the course of judicial decisions through exercise of the ap-
pointment power. A President who seeks to change the Court-as
Nixon did-can succeed only if there are vacancies to fill. Vacan-
cies alone are not enough; the vacancies must occur among Jus-
tices whose views differ from the position of the appointing
President. Particularly crucial are the voting patterns of the sit-
ting Justices. A President with allies already on the Court will be
able to effect changes much more rapidly than one who must
overcome a Court staffed entirely by opponents of his policies.
All of these factors worked in Nixon's favor to some degree.
With two vacancies in six months and four in his first term,
Nixon's opportunities to select Justices exceeded those afforded
all but a handful of previous Presidents.93 Moreover, the first two
vacancies were in seats previously held by Justices in the fore-
front of the judicial revolution Nixon had opposed in his cam-
paign. Finally, Nixon had the advantage of allies already on the
Court, as many of the decisions opposed by Nixon-most notably
Miranda94--had been rendered by a divided Court over impas-
sioned dissents.
Even with these advantages Nixon was not able to bring about
an immediate turnaround in the direction of the Court's policy.
Senate refusal to confirm southern nominees Haynsworth and
Carswell left Burger a sometimes lonely dissenter in his first year
on the Court. Even with the confirmation of a second Nixon ap-
pointee, the reaction against Warren Court libertarianism re-
mained cautious. Only after Nixon had filled all four vacancies
did the Burger Court begin to make serious inroads on the work
of the Warren Court. And even in the mature Burger Court the
change has been relative, not absolute.9 5 Nixon's appointees have
93. R. SCIGLUAO, supra note 3, at 86.
94. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
95. R. FuNSTON, supra note 36, at 372.
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not always followed the President's wishes, and in a number of
significant decisions Burger Court majorities have moved out in
new directions to support civil liberties claims. 96
What then of future prospects? Might President Carter or an-
other Democratic President use the appointment process to reest-
ablish a court more favorable to civil liberties claims? Clearly, the
1980 presidential election will be crucial in determining opportuni-
ties for such change. The lesson of Carter's first three and one-
half years is that most Presidents are not as fortunate as Nixon as
far as vacancies on the Court are concerned. Moreover, it must be
noted that more cases have been decided against civil liberties
claimants with votes to spare than by close margins. In short, if
changes comparable in magnitude to those observed in the transi-
tional years of the Burger Court are to occur again, it will require
election for more than a single term of a President as dedicated to
the goal of reversing the Court's trend as was Nixon.
96. See Abraham, supra note 90, at 77-80.
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